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 According to the traditional narrative, a fundamental change in the military role of the 
bishops of Italy occurred during the Investiture Contest, the conflict between Pope and 
Emperor which dominated Italian and German politics in the late eleventh and early twelfth 
centuries. Before this conflict, the bishops were the dominant force in Italy and formed the 
backbone of Imperial political, economic and military power in the region.1 In this way, the 
Italian bishops performed a very similar function to their counterparts north of the Alps.2 
Authors including Johnson have highlighted the similarities of Ottonian strategies regarding 
the bishops in Germany and those in Italy.3 However, unlike the members of the German 
episcopate, many of the Italian prelates lost most of their secular roles over the course of the 
Investiture Contest, as bishops selected and empowered by the emperor were replaced by 
                                                          
1 Pietro Rasi, ‘Exercitus Italicus’ e milizie cittadine nell’alto medioevo (Padua, 1937); Gina Fasoli, “Castelli e 
signorie rurali,” in Agricoltura e mondo rurale in occidente nell’alto medievo, Settimane di studio del Centro 
Italiano di Studi sull’alto medioevo 13 (Spoleto, 1966), pp. 531–67; John Beeler, Warfare in Feudal Europe, 730-
1200 (Ithaca, 1971), pp. 195 and 220; Benjamin Arnold, “German Bishops and Their Military Retinues in the 
Medieval Empire,” German History 7, no. 2 (1989), p. 183. 
2 Friedrich Prinz, Klerus und Kreieg im Früheren Mittelalter (Stuttgart, 1971). Leopold Auer, 'Der Kriegsdienst 
des Klerus unter den sächsischen Kaisern', Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung 79 
(1971), pp. 316-407, 80 (1972), pp. 48-70. Reuter, Timothy, ‘Episcopa cum sua militia: The Prelate as Warrior in 
the Early Staufer Era’, in Warriors and Churchmen in the high Middle Ages: Essays Presented to Karl Leyser, ed. 
Timothy Reuter (London, 1992), 79-94. Jan-Peter Stöckel, 'Reichsbischöfe und Reichsheerfahrt unter Friedrich I. 
Barbarossa', in Kaiser Friedrich Barbarossa. Landesausbau - Aspekte seiner Politik - Wirkung, ed. Bernhard 
Töpfer, Evamaria Engel (Weimar, 1994), pp. 63-79. 
3 Edgar Nathaniel Johnson, The secular activities of the German episcopate, 919-1024 (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1932), 
pp. 147-8. Regarding the unique or generic nature of the Imperial Church within the kingdoms of Europe see: 
Timothy Reuter, ‘The “imperial church system” of the Ottonian and Salian rulers: A reconsideration’, Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History 33 (1982), pp. 347-374; Hartmut Hoffman, ‘Der König und seine Bischöfe in Frankreich 
und im Deutschen Reich 963-1060’, in Bischof Burchard von Worms 1000-1025, ed. Willifred Hartmann, 
(Michigan, 2000), pp. 79-127. 
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bishops installed by the Gregorian papacy.4 These powers were appropriated by the proto-
communes and, in a few cases, the local nobility.5 Where the bishops remained influential, 
they did so primarily through their control of the sacraments and the leverage this provided 
over their flock.6 The changing role of the bishops is ascribed to the loss of their connection to 
the emperor, the rise of the communes and, above all, the emergence of a new ideology 
regarding the secular and military role of the bishops. This article will use a case study of the 
bishops of Parma before, during and after the Investiture Contest to challenge this perception. 
I will argue that the formal military role of the bishops of Italy was being eroded before 
Gregorian bishops were installed, and that there is considerable evidence that the Gregorian 
bishops continued to fulfil the same military roles as their imperial predecessors. The 
perception of Gregorian bishops as peaceful men of God who relinquished their military 
responsibilities is based on the ideological narrative set out by Gregorian polemicists and, 
more generally, on the political goals of the authors of the sources which detailed military 
conflict in this period. 
 “One of the most important intellectual problems which the Church faced in the 
Middle Ages was to reconcile warfare with the Christian message.”7 Graham A. Loud’s 
statement regarding the relationship between the Papacy and the Normans arriving in the 
South of Italy in the late eleventh century is even more applicable in relation to the other end 
of the peninsula. The conflict with the emperor compelled the Gregorian papacy to 
incorporate armed force as an ideologically valid resource of the Church.8 Several authors 
attempted to justify papal endorsement of military action against the emperor: Gregory VII 
                                                          
4 Reinhold Schumann, Authority and the Commune, Parma 833-1133 (Parma, 1973), p. 165; Roberto Celli, “Il 
principio del potere populare nella genesi dei comuni italiani,” in Poteri assemblee autonomie: Il lungo cammino 
verso la sovranità populare: Miscellanea in memoria di Roberto Celli (Udine, 1989), pp. 45–49; Mary Stroll, Popes 
and Antipopes: The Politics of Eleventh Century Church Reform, Studies in the History of Christian Traditions 159 
(Leiden, 2012), p. 7. 
5 Celli, “Il principio del potere populare,” p. 49. 
6 John Kenneth Hyde, Society and Politics in Medieval Italy: The Evolution of Civil Life, 1000-1350 (London, 1973), 
p. 58; Maureen C. Miller, The Bishop’s Palace: Architecture and Authority in Medieval Italy, Conjunctions of 
Religion & Power in the Medieval Past (Ithaca, NY, 2000), p. 5. 
7 Graham A. Loud, “The Church, Warfare and Military Obligation in Norman Italy,” Studies in Church History 20 
(1983), 31. 
8 Ian S Robinson, “Gregory VII and the Soldiers of Christ,” History 58, no. 193 (1973), 169–92; Edith Pásztor, “Lotta 
per le investiture e ‘ius belli’: la posizione di Anselmo di Luca,” in Sant’Anselmo, Mantova e la lotta per le 
Investiture. Atti del Convegno Internazi, ed. Paolo Golinelli, Il mondo medievale (Bologna, 1987), p. 376. 
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developed the concept of the fideles sancti Petri as warriors in the service of the Church;9 John 
of Mantua wrote defending the ideological foundation for military action in order to reconcile 
heretics;10 Anselm of Lucca went further, arguing that not only was coercive action of this sort 
acceptable, it was a duty of the Church.11 Against this, Imperial polemicists presented the 
military actions of the Gregorian popes and their supporters as illegal and immoral: A lost 
letter of the Antipope Guibert of Ravenna condemned those within the Church who 
encouraged military resistance against the Emperor.12 
 This ideological conflict did not emerge in a vacuum. As Friedrich Prinz and Maureen 
C. Miller have demonstrated there was a fundamental shift in episcopal ideology during the 
tenth century in Europe as a whole: while authors of the ninth and early tenth centuries saw 
no taboo in bishops and abbots participating in warfare, their counterparts in the later tenth 
century increasingly tended to portray “good” clergymen avoiding all forms of violence.13 
Although prohibitions against clerical violence had been promulgated since the councils of 
Toledo and Chalcedon in the fifth century,14 these restrictions were generally ignored.15 This 
was largely a consequence of the political and military realities of the ninth and tenth 
centuries: conflict with the Vikings, Saracens and Magyars meant that the bishop’s military 
role was often vital in order to defend his flock.16 It was only under the Ottonians, when these 
external threats abated, that the involvement of clergy in warfare was discussed more 
critically and an ideological shift began.17 Nevertheless, the bishops and abbots of the Empire 
retained important secular and military positions throughout the Ottonian and Salian periods. 
Bishops and abbots frequently undertook military roles; mustering and leading their militia 
                                                          
9 Karl Leyser, Communications and Power in Medieval Europe: The Gregorian Revolution and beyond, ed. Timothy 
Reuter (London, 1994), pp. 13–14; Herbert E. J. Cowdrey, Pope Gregory VII, 1073-1085 (Oxford, 1998), p. 564. 
10 Patrick Healy, “‘Merito nominetur virago’: Matilda of Tuscany in the Polemics of the Investiture Contest,” in 
Victims or Viragos?, ed. Christine Meek and Catherine Lawless, Studies on Medieval and Early Modern Women 
4 (Dublin, 2005), p. 51. 
11 Kathleen G. Cushing, Papacy and Law in the Gregorian Revolution: The Canonistic Work of Anselm of Lucca, 
Oxford Historical Monographs (Oxford, 1998), pp. 128–29. 
12 Healy, “‘Merito nominetur virago’,” pp. 51–52. 
13 Prinz, Klerus und Krieg im Früheren Mittelalter, pp. 171–72; Maureen C. Miller, “Masculinity, Reform, and 
Clerical Culture: Narratives of Episcopal Holiness in the Gregorian Era,” Church History 72 (2003), 25–52. 
14 Philippe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, trans. Michael Jones (New York, NY, 1984), pp. 268–69. 
15 Ibid., 269–70. 
16 Prinz, Klerus und Krieg, pp. 115–46, esp. 145–46; Miller, “Masculinity, Reform, and Clerical Culture,” p. 27. 
17 Prinz, Klerus und Krieg, pp. 171–72. 
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ecclesiae.18 The reality of the secular roles and wealth of the bishops meant that the ideal of 
clerical absence from violence and warfare could not be realised.19 
 The Investiture Contest brought this issue to a new head. The ideology embraced by 
many supporters of the Gregorian papacy and codified by Anselm of Lucca sought to empower 
the Church as the ultimate source for coercive action: kings and nobles were to be imbued 
with this authority by the Church (and only by the Church) in order to protect itself and its 
interests.20 However, Anselm and many others within the Gregorian movement argued that 
bishops and other clergy should remain aloof from the violence itself.21 This stands in stark 
contrast to the secular and military duties traditionally held by the Italian bishops. The works 
of Anselm and the other Gregorian canonists, alongside the general shift in the image of the 
ideal bishop, influenced subsequent depictions of the bishops of the Investiture Contest. 
Several Gregorian bishops of this period, such as Bernard degli Uberti of Parma and Anselm 
himself, were made saints in the centuries after the Investiture Contest. The vitae of these 
figures naturally portrays them embracing saintly virtues, including abstention from violence. 
Other factors influenced the portrayal of both the imperial and Gregorian bishops of the Italian 
cities in the sources of their time. This is not always considered in the discussion of the secular 
and military roles of these bishops. Rather, there remains a tendency to view imperial bishops 
as generals and Gregorian bishops as pacifists. 
 Parma is a useful case study as the city’s bishops are normally presented undergoing a 
sharp transition from militarily active, unequivocal supporters of the emperor to dutiful 
followers of the Gregorian papacy who abhorred violence. Cadalus served as Antipope 
Honorius II in opposition to Alexander II, the predecessor and close colleague of Gregory VII. 
Cadalus’ successors Everard and Guido were involved in military campaigns against the 
Gregorian papacy and under their leadership Parma remained a loyal imperial bastion. 
However, following the death of Guido, Bernard degli Uberti was installed in Parma in 1104 
with the support of Paschal II and Matilda of Canossa (traditionally the closest Italian secular 
                                                          
18 Beeler, Warfare in Europe, p. 220; Prinz, Klerus und Krieg, pp. 166–67. 
19 Loud, “The Church, Warfare and Military Obligation,” p. 31. 
20 Cushing, Papacy and Law in the Gregorian Revolution, p. 132. 
21 Carl Erdmann, The Origin of the Idea of Crusade (Princeton, NJ, 1977), p. 57; Cushing, Papacy and Law in the 
Gregorian Revolution, p. 133. 
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ally of the Gregorian papacy). While there was some dissent against Bernard, his episcopate 
is generally seen as the period in which Parma moved from an imperial orbit into a papal one 
and the point at which the military functions of the bishop were transferred to the 
commune.22 This narrative is much more simple than that of many other Italian cities. For 
example, the citizens of Mantua expelled their Gregorian bishop and accepted an imperial 
replacement when they allied themselves with the emperor in 1091; the citizens eventually 
accepted another Gregorian bishop in 1114. Because of this relative simplicity of narrative, 
the case of Parma allows a thorough consideration of the changes to the bishop’s role on the 
basis of a clear transition of power. 
 I will make two central points: 
 1) The military role of the bishops of Parma became less formalised over the course of 
the Investiture Contest, but there was always an expectation that they would support military 
activity if necessary. 
 2) There is evidence that all of the bishops of Parma, both imperial and Gregorian, 
during this period were involved in warfare. However, their precise role is ambiguous. 
This will not resolve the issue of Italian bishops and warfare during the Investiture Contest but 
it will demonstrate that several elements of the traditional narrative are in need of revision. 
 
The military rights and responsibilities of bishop of Parma 
During the centuries between the Carolingian conquest of Italy and the Investiture Contest 
the bishops of Parma obtained a series of secular rights and responsibilities. These were 
obtained primarily through royal and imperial grants but also came from other sources 
including purchases, donations from secular figures and grants from the papacy. The full 
evolution of these rights is charted by several authors,23 but the military aspects of these 
powers has not been considered in any depth. The charters which detail these rights 
                                                          
22 Gina Fasoli, “La realtà cittadina nei territori canossiani,” in Studi matildici, Atti e Memorie del III Convegno di 
Studi matildici (Reggio Emilia, 7-9 ottobre 1977) (Modena, 1978), pp. 64–65; Paolo Golinelli, “L’Italia dopo la lotta 
per le investiture: la questione dell’eredità matildica,” Studi Medievali 42, no. 2 (2001), 516; David J Hay, The 
Military Leadership of Matilda of Canossa, 1046-1115 (Manchester, 2010), p. 171. 
23 Schumann, Authority and the Commune, pp. 77–90; Gerhard Schwartz, Die Besetzung Der Bistümer 
Reichsitaliens: Unter Den Sächsischen Und Salischen Kaisern Mit Den Listen Der Bischöfe 951-1122 (Leipzig and 
Berlin, 1913, repr. Spoleto, 1993), pp. 185–88. 
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demonstrate the theoretical role of the bishop in warfare and expectations placed on them 
by the donors of the documents.  
 The earliest extant royal or imperial charter granted to the bishops of Parma was 
produced on 11 May 879 in Otting in Bavaria on behalf of Carloman, king of Bavaria and Italy. 
This document included a number of minor rights and territorial possessions, but is most 
notable for its confirmation of the bishop’s control over the public rights and tolls within the 
city of Parma as bounded by the walls (“We [Carloman] confirm the aforementioned Guibod 
and his church with all of the public rights and tolls and the districtus of this city and enclosed 
within the circuit of the walls”).24 These rights were confirmed by several subsequent kings 
and emperors and, in a charter of Otto I produced on 13 March 962 in Lucca, these rights were 
extended to encompass an area three miles around the city (“We [Otto I] transfer and 
delegate the walls of the city and the districtus and the tolls and all public functions held within 
the city and outside in all regions within three miles of the city”).25 These documents provided 
the bishop with the public rights normally reserved to the king or his designated executors 
(typically the counts). It is not unreasonable to assume that this included military rights: none 
of the charters refer to exemptions from military service. At the very least, the bishop required 
coercive powers to uphold his rights of jurisdiction (districtum). 
 The repeated references to the walls of Parma suggests a specific military function for 
the bishops of this city from at least the late Carolingian period, namely the upkeep and 
control of the city’s defences. This is expressed most clearly in the charter produced by the 
court of Otto I where the emperor explicitly assigned the walls of the city to the bishop 
(“transfundimus atque delegamus murum ipsius civitatis”).26 The bishop of Parma was 
unambiguously placed in control of the most basic and most symbolic of the city’s defensive 
measures. This grant is certainly connected to the episcopal rights over tolls (telonium) as the 
                                                          
24 “... confirmamus predicto Uuibodo et prelibate ecclesie sue omne ius publicum et toloneum atque districtum 
eiusdem civitatis et ambitum murorum in circuitu”: Die Urkunden Karlmanns, ed. Paul Fridolin Kehr, MGH 
Diplomatum Karolinorum 1 (Berlin, 1934), no. 24, p. 321. 
25 “... transfundimus atque delegamus murum ipsius civitatis et districtum et telonium et omnem publicam 
functionem tam infra civitatem quam extra ex omni parte civitatis infra tria milliaria”: Die Urkunden Otto I, ed. 
Theodor Sickel,  MGH Diplomata regum et imperatorum Germaniae 1 (Hannover, 1884),  no. 239, p. 333. 
26 Ibid. 
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walls and gates of the city provided the means to control entry and exit of goods. However, 
ultimately the walls were a military structure.  
 That control of the walls was listed first amongst the bishop’s rights further underlines 
the importance of these powers to their role and it is likely that this was Otto’s intent in 
producing the charter. In 961 Otto had descended into Italy in support of Pope John XII against 
the invasion of the papal territories by Bernegar of Ivrea. By Christmas of 961 Otto was in 
control of Pavia and Berengar’s supporters had deserted him. On 2 February 962 Otto was 
crowned emperor in Rome. The 962 charter to the bishop of Parma was produced while Otto 
was returning north to confront Berengar who was sheltering at San Leo. The document was 
designed in part as a statement of Otto’s authority and right to intervene in Italy, but also as 
a means to strengthen the bishop of Parma and provide a potential ally in the region. 
 Under Conrad II the bishops of Parma received the greatest confirmation of their 
secular powers. In a document issued in Augsburg on 15 February 1036 Conrad granted Bishop 
Hugh (1027-1040) control of the comitatus within the diocese of Parma.27 This was a 
substantial extension of the bishop’s existing rights and essentially gave him the role of the 
count of Parma. This included political, judicial and economic rights and responsibilities as well 
as the military authority necessary to uphold these rights and to provide support for the 
emperor.28  
 The control of the comitatus was confirmed on Hugh’s successor Cadalus (1045-1072) 
by the emperor Henry III in a charter produced on 1 May 1047 in Mantua.29 Cadalus is the last 
bishop for whom we have a charter which formally sets out the bishop’s right to the comitatus. 
However, an imperial charter to the cathedral chapter of Parma created on 3rd December 
1081 refers to Everard (1074-1085) as bishop and head of the episcopal see and county 
(comitatus) of Parma.30 The use of this phrase, and the reference to the comitatus in 
particular, is unique amongst imperial descriptions of the bishop of Parma. Its use here was 
                                                          
27 Die Urkunden Konrads II, ed. Harry Bresslau, MGH Diplomata regum et imperatorum Germaniae 4 (Hannover, 
1909), no. 226, pp. 140-1. 
28 Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p. 40. 
29 Die Urkunden Heinrichs III, ed. Harry Bresslau, MGH Diplomata regum et imperatorum Germaniae 5 (Berlin, 
1931), no. 197, p. 385-6. 
30 “Eurardus episcopus et preses ipsius Parmensis episcopii et comitatus”: Die Urkunden Heinrichs IV, ed. Harry 
Bresslau, MGH Diplomata regum et imperatorum Germaniae 6 (Hannover, 1909), no. 340, p. 449. 
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designed to underline Everard’s political and military authority and responsibilities. The 
document emphasised the three-way relationship between the emperor, the bishop of Parma 
and his cathedral chapter connecting the rights of the cathedral to those of the bishop. The 
document was issued in Parma itself when Henry and the imperial host was travelling south 
to Rome to confront Gregory VII; its timing allowed Henry to ensure the loyalty of the 
cathedral chapter in this conflict and to ensure that this body would not challenge the bishop’s 
ability to participate in his campaign. 
 After Everard, there is no indication that subsequent bishops of Parma enjoyed control 
over the comitatus. No charters survive which confirm these rights on any subsequent bishop 
and none of Everard’s successors are given a title incorporating the comitatus. At the same 
time, counts of Parma appear more frequently in the charter record. The office of count never 
ceased to exist in Parma but after the 1036 grant to Hugh, his rights over the comitatus were 
restricted to the territory within the county of Parma which lay outside the diocese of Parma: 
namely Bismantova, a small section of territory to the east of the county.31 For much of the 
eleventh century the power of the counts was negligible in most of the county. However, 
towards the end of the eleventh century the counts of Parma began to operate outside these 
marginal areas. Most notably on 29 June 1093 Count Ubert issued a charter to the abbey of 
San Giovanni, an institution within the walls of Parma, while holding court just outside the 
city.32 The comitatus and its associated roles were quite possibly being usurped by the counts. 
 This is not to say that Guido and subsequent bishops of Parma were completely 
removed from their secular and military roles and responsibilities. On 15 June 1114 Matilda 
of Canossa granted Bernard degli Uberti (1104-1133) control of the town of Montecchio 
Emilia.33 This strategically important location dominated a key river crossing between Parma 
and Reggio and suggests an ongoing military role for the bishop of Parma. Another Bernard, 
bishop of Parma (1167?-after 1186) under Frederick I, received several imperial grants 
concerning landholdings. These included, in a charter issued on 11 February 1186, control over 
                                                          
31 Schumann, Authority and the Commune, p. 45. 
32 Giovanni Drei, Le Carte Degli Archivi Parmensi Del Secoli X-XI, 3 vols (Parma, 1924–50), 2:156. 
33 Die Urkunden und Briefe der Markgräfin Mathilde von Tuszien, ed. Elke Goez and Werner Goez, MGH 
Laienfürsten- und Dynastenurkunden der Kaiserzeit 2 (Hannover, 1998), no. 132, pp. 338-40. 
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the castrum at Regnano to the south of Reggio.34 Although castrum generally referred to 
holdings with primarily political or economic functions, these sites were almost universally 
connected to military matters.35 This charter to the later Bernard demonstrates that in the 
late twelfth century the emperor expected the bishop of Parma to be able to fulfil a military 
role. While it does appear that Guido and his successors lost a large part of their formal 
military powers, it is evident that they were not intended to be entirely removed from military 
activity. 
 This account is somewhat at odds with the traditional narrative, which places Bernard’s 
episcopate as the period in which the bishops of Parma relinquished their military role. 
Certainly, there is no evidence that Bernard degli Uberti or Lanfranc were confirmed in their 
control of the comitatus or rights over the city and its walls. However, there is also no evidence 
that the pro-imperial bishops Guido, Aicard (c. 1160-1167) or Bernard were confirmed in these 
rights. Furthermore, the only indication that Everard held these rights appears in a very 
ambiguous and cursory reference. It seems that the formal military role of the bishops of 
Parma reached its zenith under Hugh and Cadalus but was then swiftly eroded under Everard 
and his successors. Bernard degli Uberti could not have relinquished these powers as they 
were no longer his to give away. At the same time, it is evident that the bishops who 
succeeded Everard retained some lesser, but nonetheless formalised, military rights and 
responsibilities. 
 
The bishops of Parma at war 
While the charter record provides a record of the theoretical formal military rights of the 
bishops of Parma, the actual extent of the involvement of these bishops in military activity is 
harder to gauge. Both the charter record and the narrative sources for these bishops 
demonstrate that Cadalus, Everard, Guido and Bernard degli Uberti were all involved in 
military activity to some extent. However, while the charter record can be used to 
                                                          
34 Die Urkunden Friedrichs I, ed. Friedrich Appelt, MGH Diplomata regum et imperatorum Germaniae 10 
(Hannover, 1975), no. 930, pp. 197-8. 
35 Fabio Cusin, “Per la Storia del Castello Medioevale,” Revista Storica Italiana 4 (1939), 491; Edward Coleman, 
“Incastellamento on the Po Plain: Cremona and Its Territory in the Tenth Century,” Reading Medieval Studies 17 
(1991), 78–86. 
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demonstrate the presence of these bishops alongside armies, they do not illuminate the role 
of the bishops within these armies. In contrast, although the narrative sources occasionally 
give explicit or implicit accounts of the position of the military position of the bishops, these 
accounts are inevitably influenced by the rhetorical and political goals of their authors. 
 The charter record provides some indication of the movements of the bishops of 
Parma in the late eleventh century and demonstrates that they often appeared in the Imperial 
entourage during periods of warfare. This does not prove that the bishops were involved in 
the fighting, but it does strongly suggest that they were in its vicinity and provided troops and 
support. Cadalus was present in the court of Henry III during his campaign against Godfrey the 
Bearded in Italy in 1055. His presence is noted in an imperial court case resolved in Zurich in 
February 1054 in favour of Hubald, bishop of Cremona, against Adelheid, Abbess of San Maria 
Theodota in Pavia.36 Cadalus appeared again at another court case in Borgo San Genesio near 
Pisa on 15 June 1055 resolved in favour of Abbot Landulf of San Prospero in Reggio against 
one Margrave Azzo.37 Guido can likewise be connected to Henry’s campaign of 1090 to 1097 
in Lombardy and Emilia. He appears as a witness to an imperial charter produced in Botticino 
in the county of Brescia in 1091.38 It is probable that Guido remained with Henry’s forces 
throughout the rest of the emperor’s expedition: no charters or other sources survive 
indicating Guido’s location until his presence at the synod held in Vercelli by the antipope, 
Guibert of Ravenna in 1098.39  
 There is a corresponding indication that the Gregorian bishops of Parma Bernard degli 
Uberti and Lanfranc travelled with military forces, although not necessarily those of the 
emperor. Bernard was a staunch supporter of the reform movement and in fact was briefly a 
prisoner of the emperor Henry V in 1111.40 As a result, it is unsurprising that Bernard was not 
active within the imperial host. However, Bernard appeared frequently in Matilda’s charters 
until her death in 1115.41 Matilda was not active in the conflict between Henry V and Paschal 
                                                          
36 Die Urkunden Heinrichs III, ed. Bresslau, no. 318, pp. 436-8. 
37 Ibid., no. 348, p. 475. 
38 Die Urkunden Heinrichs IV, ed. Bresslau, no. 419, pp. 558-9. 
39 Schumann, Authority and the Commune, 330. 
40 Glauco Maria Cantarella, Pasquale II e il suo tempo, Nuovo Medioevo 54 (Napoli, 1997), p. 104. 
41 Die Urkunden und Briefe der Markgräfin Mathilde von Tuszien, ed. Goez and Goez, no. 97, 114, 115, 132, 134,  
pp. 266-9, 302-4, 304-6, 338-40, 342-4. 
11 
This is an accepted manuscript of a chapter published by Brill in Between Sword and Prayer: 
Warfare and Medieval Clergy in Cultural Perspective, available online at 
http://www.brill.com/products/book/between-sword-and-prayer. It is not the copy of 
record. Copyright © 2018, Brill. 
II but was involved in a series of minor conflicts with the cities within her domain, many of 
which had rebelled against her rule during the earlier phases of the Investiture Contest. Most 
notably, Mantua remained in rebellion from 1091 until October 1114 when the city reconciled 
with Matilda and accepted her ally Manfred as bishop (1109/1114-1147).42 Bernard’s 
appearances at Matilda’s court frequently coincided with the more active periods in her 
conflicts with her cities. For example, in 1114, the final year of Matilda’s dispute with Mantua, 
Bernard was in Montebarrazone near Ferarra on 15 June 1114 where Matilda granted him the 
town of Montecchio Emilia.43 He appeared again on 23 October of that year in Bondeno in the 
county of Mantua as a witness to Matilda’s grant to the monastery of Nonantola.44 It is 
therefore very likely that Bernard was present in Matilda’s entourage when the Mantua 
rebellion ended. He may well have contributed troops to this end. Bernard’s successor, 
Lanfranc (1133-c.1160), was another reformer and appeared twice within the charters of 
Lothar III, an emperor strongly allied with the Gregorian movement, while the emperor was 
preparing his campaign against the Normans of Sicily in 1136. Lanfranc was a witness to both 
the treaty with Venice produced on 3 October 1136 and a grant of lands to Venice issued later 
that month.45 It is probable that Lanfranc, with a contingent of troops from Parma, travelled 
into southern Italy with Lothar in much the same way as Cadalus and Guido had travelled with 
the imperial host. 
 The appearance of the imperial bishops alongside armed forces is entirely in keeping 
with the typical narrative. However, the similar appearances made by the Gregorian bishops 
run counter to this narrative. Bernard and Lanfranc, as Gregorian bishops, were supposedly 
absent from military activities, but the charter record demonstrates that they were present 
within important campaigns in exactly the same manner as their imperial counterparts. There 
is no evidence within these charters that their involvement in these campaigns differed from 
that of the imperial bishops in earlier military adventures. 
                                                          
42 Dorothy F. Glass, The Sculpture of Reform in North Italy, Ca. 1095-1130: History and Patronage of Romanesque 
Façades (Farnham, 2010), p. 45. 
43 Die Urkunden und Briefe der Markgräfin Mathilde von Tuszien, ed. Goez and Goez, no. 132, p. 338-40. 
44 Ibid., no. 134, p. 342-4. 
45 Die Urkunden Lothar III und Kaiserin Richenza, ed. Emil von Ottenthal and Hans Hirsch, MGH Diplomata regum 
et imperatorum Germaniae 8 (Berlin, 1927), no. 97, 100, pp. 151-6, 160-2. 
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 The narrative sources provide some further details of the military activities of the 
bishops of Parma. As Antipope, Cadalus led two expeditions to Rome. Everard’s capture at the 
battle of Sorbara on 2 July 1084 is reported by all four of the contemporary sources for the 
battle. Landulf Junior records the capture of a group of Paterne priests by Guido’s men in 
1097. 
 The most detailed account of Cadalus’ expeditions against Rome is provided by Bonizo 
of Sutri in his Liber ad amicum. Bonizo wrote in 1085 or 1086 in the entourage of Matilda of 
Canossa.46 The central goal of his work was to justify military action against Christians in 
defence of the Church with the more specific aim of ensuring Matilda of Canossa continued 
to support the Gregorian papacy.47 Bonizo presents Cadalus entering Lombardy (after his 
election in Basel) surrounded by soldiers and accompanied by the bishops of Lombardy: 
“[Cadalus] invaded Lombardy surrounded by many soldiers, having the stubborn bishops of 
Lombardy in his company”.48 Here Cadalus is implied to be the leader of his forces. When 
Cadalus eventually arrived at Rome, Bonizo reports that he established his camp in the field 
of Nero (to the north of the city) and emerged victorious in the ensuing battle: “Meanwhile 
that man [Cadalus], odious to God, made camp in the field of Nero and, when battle was 
undertaken, by the secret judgement of God, he appeared to be the victor.”49 Again, Bonizo 
implied that Cadalus played a role of leadership within his forces. Cadalus is also found at the 
head of his troops during his second expedition to Rome in 1063. He “came into the Leonine 
city at night and invaded the church of St Peter”.50 He “retreated to the castle Sant’Angelo 
where he defended himself and he was besieged there for two years”.51 Bonizo’s insistent use 
of the third person singular underlines his portrayal of Cadalus playing a personal and leading 
role in these campaigns and battles. Even though he mentions several other individuals 
                                                          
46 Eugenio Riversi, La memoria di Canossa: saggi di contestualizzazione della Vita Mathildis di Donizone, Studi 
medioevali, nuova ser., 2 (Pisa 2013), p. 66. 
47 Ludovico Gatto, “Matilde di Canossa nel ‘Liber ad Amicum’ di Bonizone da Sutri,” in Studi matildici: Atti e 
Memorie del II Convegno di Studi matildici (Reggio Emilia, 1-3 maggio  1970) (Modena, 1971), pp. 307–25. 
48 “Qui [Cadalus] stipatus multis militibus intravit Longobardiam, habens secum in comitatu cervicosos episcopos Longobardie.” Bonizo of Sutri, Liber ad 
amicum, ed. Ernst Dümmler, Lothar von Heinemann, and Friedrich Thaner, MGH Libelli de lite imperatorum et 
pontificum 1 (Hannover, 1891), p. 595. 
49 “Interea Deo odibilis [Cadalus] ille in prato Neronis castra metatus est , occultoque Dei iudicio bello commisso victor apparuit.” Ibid.  
50 “... noctu civitatem Leonianam intravit et ecclesiam sancti Petri invadit.”Ibid. 
51 “castrum Sancti Angeli intravit ibique se tutatus est, quo in eodem castro per duos annos obsesso” Ibid. 
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involved in Cadalus campaigns, including the bishops of Lombardy but also secular leaders 
such as Cencius Stephani, Bonizo made Cadalus the embodiment of the forces attacking Rome. 
This served two functions. Firstly, it downplayed the involvement of the Lombard bishops in 
this conflict. Many of these bishops had reconciled with the papal see by the time Bonizo was 
writing. Secondly, emphasising Cadalus as the sole force involved in these attacks 
complimented Bonizo’s general depiction of the antipope. Bonizo explicitly identifies Cadalus 
with the evil which will break forth out of the north onto all the inhabitants of the land as 
described in Jeremiah 1:14: “He came to Rome from the north, from where, according to 
Jeremiah, evil shall spread over all the inhabitants of the land.”52 Cadalus almost certainly did 
play an important role in these attacks on Rome: it would be uniquely unusual for a bishop of 
his standing and power not to at least supply troops. However, Bonizo’s account over-
emphasises this role in order to support the author’s political and rhetorical goals. 
 The narrative sources are virtually silent with regards to Everard. Bonizo mentions that 
he was elected to the bishopric of Parma after the death of Cadalus and that he was a clericus 
from Cologne.53 Beyond this, the only time Everard is mentioned is in relation to the battle of 
Sorbara on 2 July 1084. Four contemporary authors provide accounts of this battle of Sorbara 
and Everard’s involvement: an anonymous priest of Lucca, in his Vita Anselmi Episcopi 
Lucensis;54 Bernold of St. Blasien in his Chronicon;55 Ranger of Lucca in his Vita Anselmi;56 and 
Donizone of Canossa in his Vita Mathildis Comitissae.57 These authors all indicate a major 
defeat of the imperial forces by Matilda’s troops and that the bishop of Parma, Everard, was 
captured. This demonstrates that Everard was present at the battle and has been used to 
suggest that he played a key role within the imperial army.58 However, his precise role is 
                                                          
52 “... ab aquilone veniret Romam, unde secundum Ieremiam pandetur malum super universos habitatores terre.”Ibid. 
53 Ibid., 600. 
54 Pseudo Bardo, Vita Anselmi Episcopi Lucensis, c. 23–24, ed. Georg H. Pertz, MGH SS 12 (Hannover, 1856), pp. 
20–21. 
55 Bernold of St. Blasien, Chronicon, ed. Georg H. Pertz, MGH SS 5 (Hannover, 1844), p. 441. 
56 Ranger of Lucca, Vita Sancti Anselmi Lucensis episcopi, ed. Ernst Sackur, Gerhard Schwartz, and Bernhard 
Schmeidler, MGH SS, MGH 30.2 (Leipzig, 1934), pp. 1292–94, ll. 6546–6616. 
57 Donizone, Vita Mathildis, ed. Paolo Golinelli and Vito Fumagalli, Biblioteca di cultura medievale 823 (Milano, 
2008), bk. 2. ch. 3, ln 304-60, pp. 148-51. 
58 Schumann, Authority and the Commune, p. 211; Tilman Struve, “Matilde di Toscana-Canossa ed Enrico IV,” in 
I Poteri dei Canossa, da Reggio Emilia all’Europa: atti del convegno internazionale di studi (Reggio Emilia-
Carpineti, 29-31 ottobre 1992), ed. Paolo Golinelli, Il mondo medievale (Bologna, 1994), pp. 440–42. 
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ambiguous. Most of these sources provide very few details about the battle and only Donizone 
gives any explicit indication of the leadership of the imperial forces. He presents the pro-
imperial army as citizens of many cities, armed and mounted, under the command of the 
proud but skilled marchess Oberto (head of the Pallavicino family, who held extensive lands 
in Parma and Piacenza):59 
 At this time many citizens from many cities 
 Took up arms at the same time, well-equipped with shields and horses, 
 Under command of the lofty prince, in short the prudent Oberto, 
 They led the bishops of Parma and Reggio.60 
 
Notably, Donizone has the bishops of Parma and Reggio being led by this force rather than the 
force being led by the bishops. By the poet’s account, the pro-imperial army was under the 
command of a secular figure while the bishops of Parma and Reggio were cast in supporting 
roles.  
 It is possible that Matilda’s forces took the pro-imperial army by surprise; a situation 
which could easily lead to non-combatants being caught in the fighting and captured. Eads 
and Hay have suggested that the battle of Sorbara may have been an ambush on the sleeping 
imperial camp by Matilda’s forces. This certainly fits with the description of the battle provided 
by Donizone. The poet describes the imperial forces camped at Sorbara, which was assigned 
as their final battlefield, before presenting Matilda’s forces attacking at dawn while the camp 
is still asleep, with a shout of “Peter! Protect your own!”: 
 Sorbaria supports the camps of these men, 
 It assigns the places of watch by their own battlefield. 
 They are resting at night, eyes assuming sleep, 
 The second light of July having begun, 
 Behold! The army of Matilda suddenly arrives: “Peter!” They proclaim 
 “Assist your own!” The enemies, saw them and  
began to rise up, the plains were stunned by such a great uproar.61 
 
                                                          
59 Schumann, Authority and the Commune, pp. 213–14. 
60 “Urbibus ex multis cives hoc tempore multi / Insimul armati, clipeis et equis falerati, / Principe cum celso, prudenti prorsus Oberto, / Ducunt Parmensem, Reginum 
pontificemque.” Donizone, Vita Mathildis, bk. 2, ch. 3, ln. 338–41, p. 150. 
61 Incipiunt, campi tanto strepitu stupefacti. / Sustinet istorum Sorbaria castra virorum, / In propriis 
campis illis tribuit loca standi. / Nocte uiescentes oculis somnum capientes, 
Iulius assumpta iam vero luce secunda, / Ecce repente phalanx Mathildis adest: “Petre” clamans / 
“Auxiliare tuis!” Inimici surgere tuti. Ibid., bk. 2, ch. 3, ln. 347–53, p. 150. 
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This account allows for Everard to be present at the camp with no intention of involvement in 
battle. He, along with the rest of the imperial forces, would have been unaware of the 
impending attack. 
 It should be noted that Donizone is the only author who presents the battle in this 
manner. None of the other writers go beyond mentioning a decisive victory for Matilda’s 
forces and say nothing of the leadership of the imperial host or of a dawn ambush. Throughout 
his work Donizone blended history and rhetoric to achieve his narrative goals. With regards to 
his account of the battle of Sorbara, Donizone underlined the role of Oberto amongst the 
defeated imperial forces, because Oberto remained an opponent of Matilda and her ally 
Bernard degli Uberti in the period when Donizone was writing (1111–1115). This is most 
evident when Donizone states that Oberto struck a single blow before speaking as if an old 
woman and fleeing without honour: 
 The aforesaid marquis [Oberto] struck a blow, 
And speaking with the voice of a grandmother, he fled without honour.62 
 
Donizone also maintained a trope throughout his work whereby Matilda and her ancestors 
are shown defeating their opponents through their cunning. For example: Matilda’s father, 
Boniface, is described twice avoiding capture by Henry III by outwitting and outmanoeuvring 
the emperor and his forces. The use of an ambush is wholly in keeping with Donizone’s use of 
this trope. Nevertheless, Donizone’s account is compatible with that of the other authors. 
None of the other writers provide a leader for the expedition and the minimal casualties (only 
three dead within Matilda’s forces) described by both the anonymous author of the Vita 
Anselm and Ranger of Lucca,63 although surely an exaggeration, could easily correspond to the 
type of ambush described by Donizone. If nothing else, Donizone’s account underlines the 
expectation that an imperial army would be led by a secular figure even if it comprised troops 
supplied by bishops. Guido’s involvement in military matters is recorded only by the Historia 
Mediolanensis of Landulf Junior. Landulf reports that the Paterene priests Liprand, Arnald and 
Siro were captured by Guido’s men in 1097: “But yet, on the second day of his journey with 
                                                          
62 Marcio predictus [Oberto] quendam transverbat ictu, / Et quasivoce loquens nonnae, sine fugit 
honore. Ibid., pp. 356–57. 
63 Pseudo Bardo, Vita Anselmi, c. 24, ed. Pertz, pp. 20-1; Ranger of Lucca, Vita Sancti Anselmi Lucensis episcopi, 
ed. Sackur, Schwartz and Schmeidler, p. 1293, ll. 6558–59. 
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the priest Arnald, teacher of the school of Milan, and Siro, priest of the consecrated church of 
Saint Mary at Podoni, they were captured by the men of the bishop of Parma.”64 Landulf gives 
no indication of Guido’s personal involvement in this action; in fact Guido is not mentioned by 
name. It is quite possible that the homines Parmensis episcopi acted without instruction from 
Guido―as indicated above, there is no evidence that he ever set foot in Parma. In any event, 
Landulf’s account removes Guido from personal military involvement. 
 Cadalus, Everard and Guido are all mentioned in connection to violent activity during 
their episcopates. To a certain extent this corresponds to the traditional narrative of imperial 
bishops leading armies on behalf of the emperor. However, the military role of these bishops 
appears to have been overstated: Bonizo’s portrayal of Cadalus leading his forces against 
Rome was part of a narrative device comparing Cadalus to a biblical evil; Donizone’s account 
of the battle of Sorbara demonstrates Everard in a supporting role despite the issues with the 
source; and Landulf’s account of the homines Parmensis episcopi in action against the 
Paterenes is a footnote and almost completely removes Guido from the events. 
 There is corresponding evidence within the narrative sources that Bernard degli Uberti 
was involved in similar activities. Bernard can be found directing military action against the 
citizens of Borgo San Donnino in 1108. This town was traditionally subservient to the bishop 
of Parma, but had become separated during the Investiture Contest.65 The 1108 expedition 
curbed the expansion of the town’s influence but failed to return it to the episcopal 
jurisdiction.66 Bernard is mentioned in connection to the conflict between Parma against 
Cremona and Piacenza in 1120 and against Cremona alone in 1121. In 1127 Bernard also 
attempted to provide military support for Lothar III against the Staufen anti-king, Conrad of 
Swabia. However, this endeavour was thwarted by the preference of the citizens of Parma for 
Conrad. 
 Bernard’s involvement in these conflicts has been incorrectly downplayed. For 
example, Schumann argues that Bernard had difficulty enforcing his secular authority as he 
                                                          
64 “Verumtamen altera die faciens iter suum [Liprand] cum presbitero Arnaldo magistro scolarum Mediolanensi, et Siro sacerdote ecclesie sancte Marie Podoni, captus est 
ab hominibus Parmensis episcopi.” Landulf de Sacto Paulo, Historia Mediolanensis a. 1097-1137, c. 3, ed. Ludowicus Bethman 
and Philippe Jaffe, MGH SS 20 (Stuttgart, 1868), p. 22. 
65 Schumann, Authority and the Commune, pp. 214–15; Hay, The Military Leadership of Matilda of Canossa, p. 
172. 
66 Schumann, Authority and the Commune, p. 215. 
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was not a vassal of the emperor and so had no legitimising source for this authority.67 He 
acknowledges the references to warfare within the sources detailing Bernard’s life, but argues 
that he adopted an auxiliary role allowing the citizens of the proto-commune in Parma to take 
control of military activity.68 Bernard is portrayed embracing the ideals of just war and of the 
Church empowering secular powers to carry out this just war. 
 However, there are some fundamental issues with this portrayal. The main sources 
which discuss Bernard’s episcopate are his three vita, all of which were designed by their 
authors to underline his piety. As a result, the authors of these sources presented Bernard 
behaving as the ideal priest. His involvement in military activity was therefore portrayed along 
the lines of Anselm’s views of just war: Bernard, as the representative of the Church 
empowered secular forces to engage in coercive action to return those who strayed from the 
Orthodox path to the Catholic fold. For example, the account of the rebellion of Borgo San 
Donnino given by the anonymous author of the first of Bernard’s vitae states that Bernard’s 
greater and lesser subjects met regarding the town of Borgo San Donnino whose citizens were 
raging against Bernard’s church. Bernard called on his subjects to return Borgo San Donnino 
to friendship and favour: 
 
Accordingly, at that time, in which he was elected bishop, the great men met with the 
lesser subjects of the mother Church for the subjection of Borgo San Donnino, whence 
the citizens were indignantly raging against them [Bernard and his subjects], and they 
were often called upon by the priest and his legates, to return it [Borgo San Donnino] 
to the favour and harmony of peace.69 
 
The author has Bernard directing coercive action against his wayward subjects in the manner 
prescribed by Anselm. Moreover, this distancing of Bernard from the military coercion of the 
city enables the author to separate the bishop from the violence which ensued, which the 
author himself terms murder and outpouring of blood.70 In a similar manner, during his 
account of the attack on Parma by the Piacenzans and Cremonese in 1120, Atto of Pistoia has 
                                                          
67 Ibid., pp. 213–14. 
68 Ibid., pp. 220–21. 
69 “Eo siquidem tempore, quo in episcopum electus est, maiores cum minoribus subiectioni matricis ecclesie obviarunt de Burgo sancti Donini, unde civitas contra eos 
furens indignabatur, et sepe vocati sunt per sacerdotem eiusque legatos, ut ad pacis concordieque gratiam remearent.” Vita I. Bernardi Episcopi Parmensis, 
ed. Ernst Sackur, Gerhard Schwartz, and Bernhard Schmeidler, MGH SS, MGH 30.2 (Leipzig, 1934), c. 4, p. 1318. 
70 “Homicidiis et effusione sanguinis” Ibid.  
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Bernard presenting the citizens of Parma with a banner and instructing and praying that they 
avoid killing and the shedding of blood: “It is said he presented with holy hands a banner to 
the citizens for the defence of the city, instructing and praying that they restrain themselves 
as far as possible from murder and shedding of blood.”71Again, Bernard is portrayed directing 
coercive action while asking for restraint. 
 A secondary goal of the authors of the first two of Bernard’s vitae was to cement the 
fledgling loyalty of the proto-commune in Parma to the Papal See. Both the anonymous author 
of the first vita and Atto of Pistoia wrote shortly after Bernard’s death.72 Bernard’s 
predecessors had maintained a strong relationship with the German emperors for a century 
and a half prior to his installation. As demonstrated by Bernard’s incarceration when he first 
arrived at Parma,73 many of those within the commune of Parma retained loyalties to the 
German crown or at least a sense of hostility towards the Gregorians. The vitae provided their 
authors with an opportunity to present the citizens of Parma working with the reforming 
bishop and hence to construct new loyalties. Warfare was a theme which could easily evoke 
this kind of comradeship: Bernard’s appeal to his congregation against Borgo San Donnino 
described above presented the bishop and the city working in concert. The author of the first 
vita portrayed the 1130 attack on Parma by the Cremonese as a threat to both the bishop and 
the people of Parma. In his account of the fall of Brescello―a fortification to the north east of 
Parma on the River Po―by treachery to the Cremonese, the author repeatedly connects the 
bishop and the citizens of Parma: 
And likewise, in the obstinacy of their evil, enduring, envying and attacking the bishop 
and his citizens, they corrupted certain men through bribery, who surrendered a very 
well-fortified place opposite his city, namely Brescello, where they stationed a great 
number of soldiers and began to scare and to harass gravely the bishop and the 
community of people.74  
 
                                                          
71 “Fertur etiam sacris manibus pro defensione patriae suis civibus tribuisse Vexillum, praecipiens et deprecans quatenus se ab homicidiis et effusione sanguinis custodirent.” 
Atto of Pistoia, Vita Secunda Sancti Bernardi, ed. Ireneo Affò, Vita di San Bernardo degli Uberti Abate gen. di 
Vallombrosa Cardinale di S. Chiesa e Vescovo di Parma (Parma, 1788), p. 229. 
72 Schumann, Authority and the Commune, p. 323. 
73 Raffaele Volpini, “Bernardo degli Uberti,” in Dizionario biografico degli Italiani, ed. Alberto Maria Ghisalberti, 
vol. 9 (Roma, 1967), p. 296; Hay, The Military Leadership of Matilda of Canossa, pp. 173–74. 
74 “Itemque in sue malitie pertinatia perdurantes, invidentes et persequentes episcopum eiusque civitatem fraude pretii corruperunt quosdam viros, qui eis tradiderunt 
locum munitissimum adversus eius civitatem, Bersilum scilicet, ubi ponentes militum multitudinem terrere et vexare dure coeperunt episcopum et civitatis populum.” Vita 
I. Bernardi Episcopi Parmensis, ed. Ernst Sackur, Gerhard Schwartz, and Bernhard Schmeidler, c. 5, pp. 1318-9. 
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By underlining this connection in a time of adversity, the author attempted to create an 
ideological spirit of cooperation between the reforming bishops and the citizens of Parma, and 
hence draw Parma further into the orbit of Rome. 
 If this rhetoric is taken into account, then we find that Bernard was involved in several 
military actions although his precise role remains ambiguous. Bernard certainly had to 
maintain the support of the proto-commune; this is evidenced by the ability of the citizens to 
imprison him or drive him from the city. However, the auxiliary role assigned to Bernard by 
the authors of the sources is probably an overstatement. Bernard appeared repeatedly in 
connection to warfare, he was present on campaign with Matilda and was entrusted with the 
control of strategically important locations. Bernard’s military rights and responsibilities were 
not formalised to the same extent as those of Cadalus had been and Bernard was not always 
able to deploy troops as he wished. However, Bernard was nevertheless demonstrably active 
within the military.  
 
Conclusion 
A new narrative may therefore be proposed with regards to the changing military role of the 
bishops of Parma. Their formal military role was diminished over the course of the Investiture 
Contest but they nevertheless continued to take part in warfare and were expected to take 
part in warfare by their secular allies. The introduction of a Gregorian bishop in the form of 
Bernard degli Uberti did little to change this: Bernard was involved in several campaigns and 
the difficulties he faced in utilising his military power were the consequence of a trend which 
had begun long before he arrived in Parma. The authors of the sources which discuss these 
bishops at war give accounts according to their own ideological and rhetorical goals which 
often led to the distortion of the actual role of the individual bishops. The typical modern 
account of the military role of these bishops overlooks this and places too much emphasis on 
a sudden change during Bernard’s episcopate. Moreover, preconceptions about the secular 
and military position of imperial and Gregorian bishops has led to the formation of 
assumptions about the bishops of Parma which are not supported by the sources. 
 This has important consequences for our understanding of the history of Parma in the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries. If the introduction of a Gregorian bishop was not the primary 
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causal factor in the emergence of communal power in place of episcopal authority, then other 
influences must be reconsidered. The lapse in formal episcopal power can be traced as far 
back as Everard so common trends during his episcopate and that of Guido and Bernard may 
provide an indication of the cause for this change. All three of these bishops were absent from 
their See for extended periods and this could be an important area for further research. 
 Parma is a relatively simple case study. Nevertheless, these observations can be 
usefully applied to other cities. There are numerous bishops associated with the Gregorian 
reform movement who held military responsibilities. Even Anselm of Lucca held castles from 
Matilda of Canossa.75 The general assumption that imperial bishops in Italy were warlike and 
secular while their Gregorian counterparts were peaceful and sacral needs to be challenged. 
More generally, the arguments presented above underline the difficulties inherent in defining 
bishops of the Investiture Contest as “imperial” or “Gregorian”. The terminology is convenient 
but, as a growing number of authors point out, it is often inaccurate and misleading.76 The 
Investiture Contest was not a simple two sided struggle for supremacy but a network of 
shifting alliances and ideologies. Reducing the bishops and other figures involved in this 
conflict to one dimensional supporters of one side or the other impairs our understanding of 
not just the military aspects of this contest, but of the contest as a whole. 
 
 
                                                          
75 Die Urkunden und Briefe der Markgräfin Mathilde von Tuszien, eds. Goez and Goez, no. 20, pp. 81-3, no. 21, 
pp. 83-5, 26, pp. 97-104 and no. 28, pp. 104-7. 
76 See Maureen C. Miller, “The Crisis in the Investiture Crisis Narrative,” History Compass 7, no. 6 (2009), 1570–
76. 
